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1. Introduction 
____________________________________________________ 
 
1.1 - Need for Cognitive Closure as Epistemic Motivation 
 
The Need for Cognitive Closure (NCC), a psychological motivational construct between the 
cognitive and the social domain, has been originally introduced by Arie Kruglanski (1980) in a 
scientific article on epistemics. NCC theory has been applied to a variety of phenomena in the 
field of social cognition (see Kruglanski&Webster, 1996) and of cognitively driven group 
dynamics (see Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006).  
NCC is defined as the desire for “an answer on a given topic, any answer . . . compared to 
confusion and ambiguity” (Kruglanski, 1990, p. 337). It constitutes a core motivational 
construct of Kruglanski’s theoretical framework of lay epistemics, a theory about the process of 
knowledge formation and consolidation (e.g., Kruglanski, 1980, 1989; Kruglanski, Dechesne, 
Orehek, & Pierro, 2009; Kruglanski, Orehek, Dechesne, & Pierro, 2010). NCC’s magnitude is 
determined by the perceived costs and benefits of being “closed”. A known trigger for high 
situational NCC is time pressure that people daily experience (e.g., Bukowski, von Hecker, & 
Kossowska, 2013; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983, Richter & Kruglanski, 1998; Roets & Van Hiel, 
2011a). The attainment of closure cut off the necessity for further information processing when 
it is difficult and/or aversive. For example, if a task is boring or not interesting (e.g., Webster, 
1993a), if performance is impeded by external stressors such as environmental noise (e.g., 
Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), or if processing is tiresome (e.g., Webster, Richter, & 
Kruglanski, 1996), people may also experience an increased desire to reach closure (see 
Kruglanski, 2004; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996 for an overview). Kruglanski and Webster 
(1996) portrayed the motivation toward cognitive closure as lying on a continuum between a 
high need to attain closure and a high need to avoid it. For instance, in circumstances where 
information processing is experienced as intrinsically rewarding or of high interest (e.g., 
Webster, 1993b), people are more motivated to postpone or avoid closure. In addition to 
transient states induced by situational determinants, the NCC also represents a dimension of 
stable individual temperamental differences (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Individuals with 
high levels of dispositional NCC are characterized by a preference for order and predictability, 
afforded by secure knowledge that is stable across circumstances and unchallenged by 
exceptions. High NCC individuals also experience an urgent desire to reach firm decisions, 
reflected in their need for decisiveness, and their discomfort feeling toward ambiguity, 
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experiencing situations lacking closure as aversive. Finally, they are closed-minded, resistant to 
information inconsistent with their firm opinions, and reluctant to have their knowledge 
challenged (Roets, Kruglanski, Kossowska et al., 2015). To measure “trait” NCC, Webster and 
Kruglanski (1994) developed the NCC scale, which was later revised by Roets and Van Hiel 
(2007), and cross-culturally adapted (Mannetti, Pierro, Kruglanski et al., 2002). Both the 
original and the revised scale include the five initially proposed expressions of NCC: 1- 
preference for order, 2- preference for predictability, 3- decisiveness, 4- aversion for ambiguity, 
and 5- closed-mindedness. Several studies have shown consistently that the effects obtained 
with the individual difference measure converge with those obtained with the situational 
manipulations of NCC (e.g., see Roets, Van Hiel, Cornelis, & Soetens, 2008; Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994). Such convergence supports the claim that motivation for closure is a 
psychological mindset with a variety of determinants including situational conditions and 
chronic personality tendencies, with temperamental and genetic origins, as well as stemming 
from cultural norms and habits (see Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). The construct of NCC fits 
within the long history of psychological research and theorizing on individuals’ tendency 
toward closed- versus open-mindedness and shares features with related concepts such as 
intolerance of ambiguity (Eysenck, 1954; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949), uncertainty orientation 
(Sorrentino & Short, 1986), openness to experience (McCrae & Costa, 1985), and need for 
cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). NCC is distinct from these other notions due to its 
explicitly motivational foundations, rather than cognitive or personality ones (see Kruglanski, 
2004; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Empirically, NCC yields modest relations with these 
variables, and yields unique relations with third variables (see e.g., Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006; 
Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Onraet, Van Hiel, Roets, & Cornelis, 2011; Roets & Van Hiel, 
2011b). 
When the level of situational or trait NCC is high, the absence of closure represents a stressful 
divergence from a desired state. Roets and Van Hiel (2008) found that, in a decision-making 
context, individuals high (but not low) in NCC showed higher levels of distress both in terms of 
increased systolic blood pressure and increased heart rate during the task, and in terms of 
increased retrospectively reported distress. In a follow-up study (ibidem) where closure was not 
readily attainable, high (but not low) NCC individuals showed a progressive increase of 
galvanic skin response (GSR), which is considered a measure of the general arousal, when not 
conclusive solutions were obtained. Also, for high NCC individuals, this stressful absence of 
closure tends to promote activities aimed at the attainment of closure, and influence the 
individuals’ choices and preferences (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; p. 264); these affect 
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information processing, knowledge formation, and decision-making. Theoretically, high NCC 
was said to prompt two general tendencies, known as “urgency” and “permanence” 
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Urgency denotes an inclination to seize quickly on information 
that seems to bring about closure. Individuals with high levels of NCC may often jump to 
judgments based on partial or inconclusive evidences. Permanence, in contrast, denotes the 
inclination to maintain closure by holding onto or freezing on the acquired knowledge. This 
freezing process reinforces the consolidation of such knowledge, and protects it against the 
threat of ambiguous information. Both “gate-keeping” tendencies serve to escape the aversive 
lack of closure, by terminating this state quickly (urgency), and by keeping it from recurring 
(permanence). One of the most straightforward consequences of the inclination to seize and 
freeze elicited by NCC pertains to the extent to which people categorize information and 
develop hypotheses. Indeed, the desire to reach closure quickly, and to subsequently maintain 
it, should lead people to take in consideration less information than necessary when making 
judgments. Mayseless and Kruglanski (1987) asked participants to identify a series of briefly 
presented, individual digits. Participants were allowed to request repeated presentations of the 
digit to be identified. The extent of informational search was highest in the need to avoid 
closure condition (induced by manipulation of the fear of invalidity), intermediate in the control 
condition, and lowest in the NCC condition (induced by instructions stressing the formation of 
unambiguous opinions, rather than the importance of being correct). This effect later was 
corroborated by Roets and collegues (2008) across different NCC manipulations (i.e., noise, 
time pressure, and fear of invalidity), and was cross-validated with the dispositional measure of 
NCC (Roets et al., 2008; Roets & Van Hiel, 2006). The moment when a belief “crystallizes” 
and turns from conjecture to a subjectively firm and true “fact” (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) 
represents the demarcation point that separates seizing from freezing tendencies. A joint 
operation of both seizing and freezing tendencies may underlie the NCC effects. Indeed, most 
decisions involve both pre- and post-crystallization stages, and seizing and freezing processes 
are strongly aligned because the motivation to quickly reach the closure or ending the aversive 
lack of it, and the motivation to remain in this state or preventing the aversive lack of closure 
from recurring, are strongly interlaced. NCC differences in information sampling and 
categorization are most prominent under conditions where epistemic motivation is most 
relevant for behaviour (see Wright & Kirby, 2001). In another study, (Mayseless & Kruglanski, 
1987) where presented to participants enlarged pictures of common objects, taken at unusual 
angles to mask their specific structure, and asked participants to list all hypotheses about the 
identity of the object. The number of generated hypotheses was the smallest in the high NCC 
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condition, intermediate in the control condition, and largest in the need to avoid closure 
condition. In addition to these effects, the NCC, through the instigation of seizing and freezing 
tendencies, has effects on a number of classic phenomena in social and cognitive psychology 
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). It was shown that high NCC induced through time pressure 
inflates primacy effects (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Freund, Kruglanski, & Shpitzajzen, 1985; 
Heaton & Kruglanski, 1991; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; Webster et al., 1996), increases the 
tendency to base judgments on stereotypes (Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & 
Schaper, 1996; Jamieson & Zanna, 1989), and heightens assimilation of numerical estimates to 
anchor values (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). It was also demonstrated that NCC increases 
attributional biases (Webster, 1993a) and the effects of priming (Ford & Kruglanski, 1995). 
Each of these effects reflects an urgency driven reliance on accessible early information, and a 
permanence driven disregard of later information. Stereotypes and other early salient cues 
provide initial bases for judgments. Moreover, because repeated exposure is assumed to 
increase the perceived plausibility of an initial hunch, the strong reliance on such initial 
“information” under high NCC can also strengthen exposure effects, as demonstrated in a series 
of studies (Kruglanski, Freund, & Bar-Tal, 1996). Seizing and freezing also translate into 
interpersonal phenomena, such as negotiation, where high NCC individuals are shown to be 
more influenced by focal points when setting limits and making concessions, and to rely 
strongly on stereotypic and preliminary perceptions of their opponents (DeDreu, Koole, & 
Oldersma, 1999). In addition, different studies examined NCC effects in intra- and inter-group 
contexts. Kruglanski and collegues (2006) integrated these social NCC effects under the 
hypothesis of group-centrism. Specifically, it has been revealed that individuals with high NCC 
levels tend to prefer an autocratic group decision structure, in which consensus is stable and 
closure affordable, deriving from the disproportionate influence of the group’s leaders (De 
Grada, Kruglanski, Mannetti, & Pierro, 1999; Pierro, Mannetti, De Grada, Livi, & Kruglanski, 
2003). The group-centric tendency manifest under high NCC also finds expression in pressure 
toward opinion uniformity, including a firm rejection of opinion deviates (Kruglanski & 
Webster, 1991), a distaste for diversity of membership, as well as aversion toward Outgroups 
whose actions or opinions may threaten the Ingroup’s point of view (Pierro et al., 2003; Shah, 
Kruglanski, & Thompson, 1998). In line with this, Livi and collegues (2015) found that groups 
composed of individuals high (vs. low) on NCC exhibited greater stability of group norms 
across different generations of group members. Because groups provide shared knowledge that 
is easily accessible, high NCC individuals are wishful to embrace the attendant epistemic 
security and to protect it from outside influences as well as from inside threats. Group-centrism 
  13 
 
 
can be considered the result of reliance on easily accessible, shared Ingroup knowledge as well 
as derogation of new Outgroup information. Differential effects of seizing and freezing can 
also play an important role in the acculturation processes of immigrants. In particular, Kosic, 
Kruglanski, Pierro, and Mannetti (2004) examined the impact of NCC on the acculturation of 
Croatian and Polish immigrants in Italy. Consistently, acculturation patterns were interactively 
determined by immigrants’ NCC and the reference group in which they found themselves upon 
their arrival. Specifically, if the immigrants arrived in the host country together with other co-
ethnics, higher levels of NCC were linked with a stronger tendency to adhere to the culture of 
origin (freezing) and thus decreased their tendency to assimilate to the host culture. By contrast, 
if on arrival they found themselves without other co-ethnics, higher levels of NCC augmented 
their tendency to embrace and adapt to the host culture and consequently reduced their 
adherence to the culture of origin. These findings indicate that, with the aim to reduce the 
considerable uncertainty associated with arrival in a new country, high NCC immigrants may 
turn to whichever cultural reference framework is most able to provide closure; in the group of 
co-ethnics, freezing on the culture of origin provides most immediate closure, whereas in the 
absence of the co-ethnic reference group, assimilation to the host country (seizing) provides 
closure best. 
Other behavioural studies have demonstrated that high NCC is related to an increased focus on 
a specific part of the cognitive field, suggesting that it affords cognitive selectivity and the 
ability to shut out irrelevant noise (Kossowska, 2007a, 2007b; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; 
Pica et al., 2013, 2014). It has also been revealed that NCC reduces the incidence of uncertainty 
and conflictuality by privileging answers that accommodate precedent experience, representing 
a goal pursuit that turns attention away from discrepancy. These psychological differences 
between high and low NCC individuals may map onto two cognitive processes: attentional 
control (Lackner, Santesso, Dwyan, Wade & Segalowitz, 2013) and conflict monitoring 
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Kossowska and collegues (2015) 
investigated whether NCC is related to selective attention, as reflected in Event-Related 
Potentials (ERPs) during a classical Stroop task (1935) as well as a Visual Distractor Task 
(VDT). In this latter task, a small letter against an emotional picture was presented in a random 
location on the computer screen. The required response was determined by a cue shown just 
before the picture. Both of the tasks involved competition between target and irrelevant 
features, and require participants to answer to one dimension of a stimulus rather than another 
stronger and conflicting one. Therefore, these tasks require feature selection and allow to study 
early allocation of attention to the selected feature of the stimuli. The selective attentive control 
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is usually indexed by N1 component of the ERPs (Herrmann & Knight, 2001), a negative visual 
evoked component with peak at 150-200ms, in the direction of greater deviations in N1 for 
increased focus on attended stimuli and increased suppression of attentional response to 
unattended ones (Singhal, Doerfling, & Fowler, 2002). This study revealed that individuals 
with higher NCC levels allocate more attention to the selected stimuli of features, and this 
behaviour is related to higher N1 amplitude both in Stroop (bilaterally) and VDT (right-sided). 
In addition, Kossowska, Czarnek, Wronka, Wyczesany, and Bukowski (2014) have shown that 
high (vs. low) NCC is related to conflict monitoring process, defined as a general mechanism 
for detecting when one’s habitual response tendency is mismatched with responses required by 
the situation (Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). Specifically, low NCC level was associated 
with higher conflict-related neural activity when response inhibition was required. The 
ElectroEncephaloGraphic (EEG) activity was recorded as participants completed a Stroop task. 
Conflict-related Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) activity was indexed by two ERP 
components: error-related negativity (ERN), a negative evoked component with peak at 80-
150ms, and the N2 component, a negative wave with peak at 200-350ms. Low NCC level was 
strongly and negatively correlated with ERN amplitudes, as well as with N2 amplitudes when 
participants performed incongruent vs congruent trials. To summarize, high NCC was related 
with higher neural activity when selection processes occurred (increased N1 component), while 
also predicting lower conflict-related activity (decreased ERN and N2 components). These 
results suggest that a speeded neural response to a distracting stimulus in high NCC 
individuals, disengaging attention from task-irrelevant information, confers some advantage in 
acting as a barrier against anxiogenous uncertainty and minimizing the experience of error 
(Hajcak, 2012; Weinberg, Riesel, & Hajcak, 2012). On the other hand, the greater selective 
focus on the target exhibited by high NCC individuals may exact a toll on flexibility due to 
freezing. In a study by Viola and collegues (2014), it has been used the Flanker Task (Eriksen 
& Eriksen, 1974) to investigate this hypothesis. Participants were instructed to answer to a 
centrally presented target but they had to disregard surrounding flanker stimuli, congruent or 
incongruent with the target one. It was found that high NCC individuals exhibited lesser 
cognitive flexibility, operationally defined as a reduced response time to incongruent vs 
congruent relations between target and flanker stimuli if the preceding trial was incongruous 
(vs congruous). Of particular interest, these differences were mediated by decreased cortico-
cortical connectivity between the ACC and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) as 
assessed by a generalized PsychoPhysiological Interactions (gPPI) analysis. Such reduction of 
the functional connection between the ACC and DLPFC regions has previously been related to 
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impairment of mechanisms for adaptation to conflict (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & 
Cohen, 1999; Kerns et al., 2004). 
 
 
1.2 - Emotions’ role in Cognition and Decision Making 
As a large body of scientific research documents, moods and emotions can influence cognitive 
processes (see Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Forgas, 1995; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). 
Emotions influence attention (Vuilleumier, 2005), decision-making (Bechara, Damasio et al., 
1999), memory (Phelps, 2006), physiological responses (Cacioppo et al., 2000; Levenson, 
2003), and social interactions (Keltner & Kring, 1998). However, even as they shape a lot of 
intrapersonal and interpersonal processes, emotions are subject to modification. The successful 
regulation of emotion is related to important psychological, social, and physical outcomes 
(Gross, 2002; Abelson et al., 2005; Gross, 2007). Conversely, difficulties with emotion 
regulation have been considered as a mechanism underlying mood and anxiety disorders 
(Campbell-Sills & Barlow, 2007). Understanding the impact of different types of emotion 
regulation on experience, behaviour, and neural dynamics, may inform clinical practice and 
research. Gross’ model of emotion regulation (1998) distinguishes between antecedent-focused 
strategies, which modulate early emotional tendencies, before they give rise to full responses, 
and response-focused strategies, which modulate the emotional responses themselves once they 
have arisen.  
Individuals are more likely to recall information from memory that is congruent rather than 
incongruent with their current feelings (e.g. Bower, 1981; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978). 
Also, they may use their affective response to a target as a basis of judgement, asking 
themselves how they feel about a specific think. Individuals are likely to evaluate any target 
more positively when they are in a happy rather than a sad mood. Such evaluations are not 
obtained when they are aware that their feelings are due to an unrelated source (see Schwarz & 
Clore, 1988, 1996). Both mood-congruent recall and the use of one’s feelings as a basis for 
judgements, influence decision-making by affecting the accessibility and evaluation of 
valenced features of the current situation. Moreover, individuals in a happy mood tend to 
overestimate the likelihood of positive outcomes, and to underestimate the likelihood of 
negative ones, vice versa for individuals in a sad mood (e.g. Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Nygren, 
Isen, Taylor, & Dulin, 1996). In addition, affective states influence information processing 
(Schwarz, 2000). As largely documented, individuals who are in a happy mood are more likely 
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to adopt a heuristic processing strategy that is characterised by top-down processing, with high 
reliance on pre-existing knowledge structures and little attention to the details. In contrast, 
individuals who are in a sad mood are more likely to adopt a systematic strategy, characterised 
by bottom-up processing with little reliance on pre-existing knowledge and considerable 
attention to details (Schwarz & Clore, 1996). These differences have been observed across a 
wide range of content domains, including processing persuasive messages (e.g. Schwarz, Bless, 
& Bohner, 1991), using stereotypes in impression formation (e.g. Bodenhausen, Kramer, & 
SuÈsser, 1994), and reliance on scripts for behavioural sequences (e.g. Bless et al., 1996). 
Consistent with the more detail-oriented processing style fostered by negative moods, Luce and 
collegues (1997) have shown that decision-making process under increasing negative emotion 
becomes more extensive and proceeds more by focusing on one attribute at a time. These 
differences in processing reflects that our thought processes tend to meet the requirements of 
the current situation, which are in part signalled by our personal affective state (Schwarz,1990). 
Negative affective states may signal that the current situation is problematic and may elicit a 
processing style that pays attention to the specifics of the problematic situation. In contrast, a 
positive affective state may signal a good environment that allows us to rely on our daily 
routines and pre-existing knowledge structures. Consistent with these assumptions, mood 
effects on processing style are deleted when the informational value of the mood is questioned 
through misattribution manipulations (Sinclair, Mark, & Clore, 1994), as much as has been 
observed for judgements (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). In the field of the Theory of Games (von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), individuals in a happy mood are likely to heuristically imitate 
the behaviour of other players, whereas individuals in a sad mood base their moves on a 
systematic analysis of the structure of the game (Schwarz, 2000). These processing strategies 
result in cooperative or competitive behaviour under different conditions, challenging the 
assumption that being in a positive mood would generally increase individuals’ 
cooperativeness. 
The relationship between emotions and decision-making is bidirectional, and the positive or 
negative outcome of a decision can affect the decider’s personal feelings. Appraisal models of 
emotion can be applied to predict which outcomes are likely to elicit which emotion. In 
contrast, we may experience regret even when we get what we expected, but realise that 
another course of action would have been better than the effective one. In literature, regret and 
disappointment are the emotions that have received most attention in the decision-making field, 
focused on how the anticipation of regret and disappointment may influence individuals’ 
decisions.  
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Bell (1982, 1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1982, 1986) proposed that individuals are 
motivated to avoid the experience of regret and decide in a way that reduces the likelihood of 
this negative emotion. Because people experience more regret for acts of commission rather 
than omission (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995), one of the more problematic consequences of 
anticipated regret is a preference for action over inaction (Baron, 1994). Parents may hesitate to 
vaccinate their child when the vaccine could be potentially fatal, even under conditions where 
the likelihood of a fatal side effect is only a fraction of the death rate from the disease (Ritov & 
Baron, 1990). The role of anticipated feelings in decision-making is not limited to the emotions 
of regret and disappointment. As March (1978) showed, all decisions involve predictions of 
future feelings, but our attempts to predict future feelings are full of uncertainty, and we often 
get it wrong, resulting in suboptimal decisions (Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999). Erroneous 
predictions are particularly likely when individuals in a “cold” state are asked to predict how 
they would feel and act in a “hot” one (e.g. when hungry or sexually aroused) (Loewenstein, 
1996). So far, research into the prediction of future feelings has been primarily conducted by 
researchers in decision-making and consumer. Incidental emotions (i.e., unrelated to the target 
object) have been shown to influence how much people eat (Grunberg & Straub, 1992), help 
(Manucia, Baumann, & Cialdini, 1984), trust (Dunn & Schweitzer 2005), procrastinate (Tice, 
Bratslavsky, & Baumesiter, 2001), or price different products (Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein 
2004).  Given individuals’ general difficulties with the prediction of future feelings, one may 
think that extensive experience with an emotion-eliciting situation would increase the validity 
of his/her own predictions affecting future similar situations, but this is not always true 
(Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999), and memories of past feelings are themselves subject to 
systematic biases. Furthermore, most of the emotional changes experienced in our daily lives 
are mild and short term. Even when a strong emotion is experienced, its intensity fades away in 
a matter of seconds or few minutes (Ekman 1999).  It seems logical that the impact of emotions 
on decision-making should also be brief: as the emotional state rapidly recedes to the 
background, so should its impact on decision-making. In contrast to this view, Andrade and 
Ariely (2009) demonstrated that the influence of mild incidental emotions on decision-making 
can live longer than the emotional experience itself. 
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1.3 - Intergroup Dynamics, NCC and Emotions 
 
One of the most powerful ideas in contemporary social psychology is that the self is largely 
defined in terms of group memberships. Social categorization into specific groups, like all 
categorization processes, highlights the similarities within groups and the differences among 
them. 
In several scientific field has been explored how bias toward Outgroup can be manifested as 
different emotions (e.g. Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Mackie, 
Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993). For example, researchers in the stereotype tradition have 
linked stereotypes of incompetence or interpersonal parting to pity, contempt, or envy (Fiske et 
al., 2002). From another perspective, researchers focusing on context-specific judgments 
showed that perception of Outgroup strength or weakness relative to the Ingroup generated 
negative emotions, such as anger, disgust, or fear (Mackie et al., 2000). Cottrell and Neuberg 
(2005) focused on a specific kind of appraisal threat, and distinct emotions toward Outgroups. 
They predicted and found correlational evidence for the notion that Outgroup activate specific 
threats, such as contamination or harm, and these threats are associated respectively with 
disgust and anger. They argue that intergroup emotions are elicitated by threat appraisals, 
because groups pose evolutionarily significant ‘socio-functional threats’, including competition 
(for resources), attack, disease, and non-reciprocation.  
High levels of dispositional NCC also lead individuals to an aversion toward Outgroup 
members, who are seen as threatening for the whole Ingroup dimension (Shah, Kruglanski & 
Thompson, 1998), and also NCC pushes to make judgments based on prevailing stereotypes 
(Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, Kruglanski & Schaper, 1996; Jamieson & Zanna, 1989). In 
general, NCC seems to be a sort of motivational antecedent of intergroup hostility (e.g., Golec, 
2002; Shah et al., 1998; Kruglanski, Shah, Pierro & Mannetti, 2002; Kruglanski & Webster, 
1996), like, for example, in the form of authoritarianism and prejudice toward immigrants 
(Dhont, Roets & Van Hiel, 2013), and it also seems to be a promoter of group-centrism 
(Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti & De Grada, 2006) because of its role on categorizing Outgroup 
people. 
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2.  Need for Cognitive Closure and Negative Emotions 
toward Ingroup/Outgroup individuals in Bargaining 
Behaviour 
____________________________________________________ 
2.1 - Introduction 
Hickson & Pugh (1995) stated that culture shapes “everything”. The most accepted model of 
cultural differentiation is Hofstede’s one (1980; 2010), which started from four to six final 
dimensions: 1) Power Distance (different solutions for human inequality), 2) Uncertainty 
Avoidance (level of stress due to facing an unknown future), 3) Individualism vs Collectivism 
(integration of individuals into primary group), 4) Masculinity vs Femininity (division of 
emotional roles between women and men), 5) Long Term vs Short Term Orientation (people 
are focused on present or future and past), and 6) Indulgence vs Restraint (gratification versus 
control of basic human desires related to enjoying life). Because every individual is unique and 
different from each other, the concept of culture can be used meaningfully just by comparison 
(Hofstede, 2010).  
According to Brown’s idea (2000), the concept of Social Identity Theory (SIT, Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979; Turner & Tajfel, 1986), that is the portion of an individual’s self-concept derived 
from perceived membership in a relevant social group, needs to take account of behaviour and 
negative emotions. Subsequently, the Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) described specifically the process of shifting to see the self in 
terms of membership in a salient group with which one also identifies. It leads people to self-
stereotyping themselves as interchangeable members of the significant group. SIT itself could 
be considered as a theory of emotion (Spears, Leach, van Zomeren, Ispas, Sweetman & Tausch, 
2011), but recently the interest about the role of emotions in intergroup relationships increased 
(Mackie & Smith, 2015). This interest has culminated in the Intergroup Emotion Theory (IET, 
Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2009; Mackie, Silver, & Smith, 2004; Mackie & Smith, 2002; E. R. 
Smith & Mackie, 2006, 2008; E. R. Smith et al., 2007), which describes systematically the 
uniquely group-level nature of the categorisation, identification, and appraisal antecedents of 
intergroup emotions, and their consequences on intergroup relations. 
In literature, the assumption that every nation has its own distinctive, influential and 
describable culture, is largely argued (McSweeney, 2002). Hickson & Pugh (1995) stated that 
culture shapes “everything”. The Intergroup Emotion Theory (IET, Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 
2009; Mackie, Silver, & Smith, 2004; Mackie & Smith, 2002; E. R. Smith & Mackie, 2006, 
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2008; E. R. Smith et al., 2007) describes systematically the uniquely group-level nature of the 
categorisation, identification, and appraisal antecedents of intergroup emotions, and their 
consequences on intergroup relations. As already explained in Chapter 1, intergroup dynamics 
are also under the significant influence of NCC (Kruglanski, 1980). This consideration made us 
thinking that maybe the perceived cultural similarity of other populations than ours, negative 
emotions towards other nationalities, and individual levels of NCC, could have a considerable 
weight on bargaining behaviours, like the decision to either accept or reject economic offers 
made by players from different parts of the world. Considering the motivational nature of the 
NCC psychological construct, our hypothesis is that its levels could change individuals’ 
bargaining behaviour toward Ingroup and/or Outgroup members, shaping the motivation to 
accept or reject an economic offer. We decided to use the Ultimatum Game (UG, Güth, 
Schmittberger & Schwarze, 1982) to assess intergroup behaviour through possible differences 
in rejection rate. In this game, considering a fixed starting amount of money, one player 
(proposer) has to decide how to share it with a second player (receiver). The receiver can either 
accept (in this case both players receive the amount proposed) or reject (in this case nobody 
gets money) the offer. According to Rational Choice Theory and Expected Utility Theory, a 
rational proposer should always offer the lowest amount (typically 10%) and a rational receiver 
should accept all the proposer’s offers, instead of receiving no money because of rejection 
(Gabay, Radua, Kempton & Mehta, 2014; Glimcher, Camerer, Fehr & Poldrack, 2009). 
However, players do not typically display such a behaviour: they’re prone to accept more fair 
or close-to-fair offers (40-50%) and to reject lower ones (Gabay et al., 2014). This deviance 
from the ideal rational behaviour, as shown in literature, is due to the strong influence of 
negative emotions on judging the other player and his/her offers (Bosman, Sonnemans & 
Zeelenberg, 2001). For example, the emotion of Disgust seems to play a crucial role in shaping 
the UG irrational behaviour (Chapman, Susskind & Anderson, 2009). It seems that, when an 
individual in the role of receiver has to decide if accept or reject unfair offers (e.g., starting 
from 10$, the proposer offers 1$ and keeps for himself 9$) at the UG, he/she shows an 
activation of the “Levator Labii Alequae Nasi” facial muscle, which is considered the main 
feature of the facial expression of disgust (Rozin & Fallon, 1987), as it is evoked by unpleasant 
tastes and pictures of contaminants (Chapman et al., 2009). Also, the emotion of Anger seems 
to be involved in the acceptance process at the UG. Pillutla and Murnighan (1996) stated that 
the anger resulting from perceived injustice is a better predictor of a rejection behaviour than 
the unfairness per se. Furthermore, the probability of rejection of an unfair offer at the UG is 
positively related to the intensity of anger (Bosman, Sonnemans, & Zeelenberg, 2001). At the 
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intrapersonal level, anger is associated with competition, while at the interpersonal level it’s 
more variable, because it sometimes elicits cooperation, sometimes competition and some other 
times it has no effects at all (Van Kleef, van Dijk, Steinel, Harinck & Van Beest, 2008). It has 
also been shown that, in small groups, the Fear that an unfair offer could be rejected drives 
proposers to split equally the resources at the UG almost always (Huck & Oechssler, 1999). 
2.2 - Study1 
The principal aims of this research are 1) to investigate, in a sample of Italian people,  cultural 
differentiation in terms of perceived Closeness and Similarity toward their own nationality and 
11 other ones, 2) to understand if levels of negative emotions (Disgust, Anger and Fear) 
towards these nationalities are linked to NCC’s levels, and 3) to investigate if bargaining 
behaviour depends on this motivational construct. The first two parts of this study (Study1.a 
and Study1.b) will help us to discriminate between nationalities, creating an Ingroup/Outgroup 
differentiation from the point of view of our Italian participants. As explained in Chapter1, 
group membership, as a social form of categorization, highlights similarities within groups and 
differences among them. Taking into account the crucial role played by emotions (specially 
negative emotions) in intergroup dynamics, our hypothesis was that the same nationalities 
considered as Similar in Study1.a were the same rated as more disgusting, anger-triggering and 
fearful (Study1.b). We decided to test Similarity and emotional ratings separately to avoid the 
direct influence of one on the other (for example, a participant who defined a nationality as 
Similar, could be influenced by this answer in giving a rating about the negative emotions it 
elicitates to him). The last part of Study1 (Study1.c) will directly investigate if levels of NCC 
are linked to the decision to accept or reject offers, and if this decision is also influenced by the 
membership of the proposer. Our hypothesis is that individuals with high levels of NCC could 
reject significantly more offers from the Outgroup nationalities than from the Ingroup ones 
(compared to individuals with low levels of NCC), considering the influence of this 
psychological construct on the group centrism, the prejudice and stereotypes, and the 
motivation and decision-making. 
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2.2.1 – Study1.a: Perceived Closeness and Similarity of Different Nationalities 
for Italian Participants. 
Procedure 
We built an on line survey using Survey Monkey (Survey Monkey Inc., Palo Alto, California, 
USA. www.surveymonkey,com), in which we asked 76 Italian participants (age: Mean =27.5, 
SD=±6.8, range 20-68 ys), to indicate, on a 7-points Likert Scale, how they consider 12 
different nationalities Close (from 1, “distant”, to 7, “close”) and Similar (from 1, “different”, 
to 7, “similar”) to their own one. Specifically, they were asked how they consider each 
nationality close and similar in terms of culture and moral standards. The chosen nationalities 
were: Italian (participants’ own one), Spanish, English, Irish, Swedish, Swiss, Albanian, 
Romanian, Pakistani, Chinese, Arab and Romani.  
Results 
 We analyzed all our data (Study1.a, Study1.b and Study1.c) using R Studio (https://www.R-
project.org/) and SPSS 21 (IBM Corp., 2012). We performed the general mean and the standard 
deviation for both Closeness and Similarity per each nation considered here. We found that 
Italian nationality has been identified as the closest (Mean=6.65, SD=.80) and the most Similar 
(Mean=6.65, SD=.80) from the 76 Italian participants. Following, we found Spanish, English, 
Swiss, Irish and Swedish nationalities, while the ones perceived as further and more dissimilar 
were Albanian, Romanian, Pakistani, Chinese, Arab  and Romani  nationalities (see 
Figure2.2.1).  
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Figure2.2.1: Levels of perceived Closeness and Similarity for each nationality taken into account. On 
the Y-axis there are the points of the Likert scale for both Closeness and Similarity, on the X-axis the 12 
different nationalities considered here. 
 
For a summary of means and standard deviations, see Table2.2.1. Testing for normality with 
Shapiro-Wilk test, we found that, for each nation, both Similarity and Closeness are normally 
distributed. We found a strong direct correlation between them (r=.998, p<.01 two-tailed), as 
they were measuring the same construct. In fact, performing a univariate factor analysis, we 
extracted only one principal component (that explains 99.9% of the total variance), so we can 
state that both Closeness and Similarity measured the same factor. This is really important, 
because assures us that participants have not misunderstood the meaning of the word 
“Closeness”, for example giving it a more geo-political meaning. Considering that Similarity 
and Closeness measures the same factor, from here on we will call it just “Similarity”. 
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Table2.2.1: Means and Standard Deviations of both Closeness and Similarity for each considered 
nationality. 
 
Discussion 
In this first study, we found that Similarity and Closeness were measuring the same factor. This 
is probably due to the form of the question we asked to our participants: “How much do you 
consider this nationality as culturally and socially Close to yours?”. This question is hardly to 
misunderstand, and Closeness can’t be confused as a geographical closeness. 
We also found that Italian participants  perceive differently similar to them the 12 considered 
nationalities. They perceived their own nationality (Italian) as the most similar, but we found 
that the others were perceived dissimilar at different levels. The ones perceived as more similar 
are all occidental nationalities (Spanish, English, Swiss, Irish and Swedish), while the 
nationalities perceived as more dissimilar are: three Asian (Chinese, Pakistani and Arab), one 
geographically European (Albanian), one of the EU (Romanian) and one stateless (Romani). 
Then we can say that EU nationalities (Note: this data were collected before the Brexit results), 
with the only exception of Romanian one, are perceived by Italians as more culturally and 
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morally similar to their own culture and society. Probably, the only explanation for the fact that 
two “European” nations (one just geographically and the other both geographically and 
politically) are considered so Dissimilar is linked to the immigration phenomenon: in 2011 
Romania and Albania where respectively the 1
st
 (1,110,848 immigrants) and the 2
nd
 (515,808 
immigrants) country from which immigrants came to Italy (Zanfrini, 2013), and in 2001 they 
were respectively at the 3
rd
 and the 2
nd
 place (ibidem), so their immigration story is deeply 
rooted in Italy’s story. 
 
 
2.2.2 – Study 1.b: Disgust, Anger and Fear toward other nationalities  
In this second study we wanted to investigate the interaction between NCC and emotions, 
especially negative ones (Disgust, Anger and Fear), towards the same nationality that we 
divided in Similar and Dissimilar in Study1.a. Our hypothesis was that the less Similar 
nationalities trigger higher levels of these three negative emotions than the more Similar ones, 
and that individuals with higher levels of Need for Cognitive Closure are more prone to rate 
negatively the Dissimilar nationalities. 
 
Procedure 
155 Italian adults (128 males) (age: Mean=25.1, SD=±10.8, range 18-65 ys), recruited using 
CrowdFlower (www.crowdflower.com), were asked to answer a questionnaire built on Survey 
Monkey (Survey Monkey Inc., Palo Alto, California, USA. www.surveymonkey,com). From 
the original sample of 196 subjects, 43 participants (33 males) were removed from the analysis 
because they didn’t answer correctly to the check-question (“How much do you like the sun? (If 
you’re reading carefully, instead of put a tick on a box, write ‘I read carefully’ in the space 
below)”), or because they were not Italian (they were from Spain and Romania).  
Ratings 
Participants were asked to judge each nationality (the same 12 as Study1) in terms of Anger, 
Disgust and Fear, with the question “How much do you think to feel an emotion of 
DISGUST/ANGER/FEAR in respect to each of these groups?”. We put the survey on line two 
different times to enlarge the starting sample size, but the second time we decided to change the 
original 5-points Likert scale with a 16-points one (we were looking for an answer closer to a 
Visual Analogue Scale’s one, easier to score in terms of percentage, because in Survey Monkey 
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it is not possible to build a VAS), so part of the final sample answered using the first scale and 
the other part using the second one. To manage with this difference, we performed all the 
analysis on the extracted percentage of Disgust, Anger and Fear for each participant.  
Questionnaire 
Participants had also to answer to the Need For Cognitive Closure scale (NCC, Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994; Kruglanski et al., 2013) in its 15-items version (Roets & Van Hiel, 2007). 
They had to answer using a 6-points Likert scale (from 1, “completely disagree”, to 6, 
“completely agree”). 
Each subject received a 0.50€ payment just for participation. 
Ratings and NCC scale were presented in a randomized order. 
 
Results 
Performing a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the nationality as factor, we found 
a main effect of all the three negative emotions considered, Disgust (F=54.2,p<.001), Anger 
(F=41.02,p<.001) and Fear (F=63.61,p<.001). We also found all positive correlations between 
the three emotions considered: Anger-Disgust (r=.990, p<.01), Disgust-Fear (r=.975, p<.01) 
and Fear-Anger (r=.988, p<.01). For an overview of the ratings’ percentage see Table2.2.2. 
Because of these strong correlations between the three emotions ratings, we performed a t-test 
of the general negative emotions score for Similar and Dissimilar nationalities, finding a 
significant difference between the two groups (p<.001). Considering NCC levels (min=35, 
max=88), we decided, on the base of the NCC scale (Cronbach’s Alpha=.865), to extract two 
sub-samples, one considering just participants in the 1
st
 quartile of the distribution (low levels 
of NCC, “Lo-NCC”), and the other considering the last quartile of the distribution (high levels 
of NCC, “Hi-NCC”), excluding participants placed in the intermediate quartiles. 
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Table2.2.2: Percentage of 1)Disgust, 2)Anger and 3) Fear ratings for each nationality. 
 
 
As shown in Figure2.2.2, the Hi-NCC sub-sample (41 participants selected) rated all the 
nationalities more Disgust/Anger/Fear-eliciting than the Lo-NCC one (44 participants selected), 
especially Romani nationality. 
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Figure2.2.2: Different trends between Hi-NCC and Lo-NCC participants for 1)Disgust (upper  panel), 
2) Anger (middle panel) and 3)Fear (lower panel) ratings for all the 12 nationalities considered. 
 
 
Discussion 
In Study1.b we found that Italian nationality, which was considered the more Similar in 
Study1.a, has been not assessed as the less Disgust/Anger/Fear-eliciting one in Study 1.b. All 
the other five Similar nationalities received lower ratings of Anger, Fear and Disgust. This 
result needs a deeper investigation, but this is not the principal aim of this work. We also found 
that, in general, Lo-NCC sub-sample tended to give lower ratings of all the negative emotions 
toward every nationality, with smaller differences compared to the Hi-NCC sub-sample. A very 
recent study (De keersmaecker, Van Assche & Roets, 2016) has shown that individuals with 
high levels of NCC feel less favourable toward cultural fusion at both abstract and concrete 
level, and assign culturally fused stimuli to one discrete culture, rather than identifying them as 
culturally “hybrid”. This could also explain in part why Albany and Romany are considered so 
Dissimilar and received higher ratings for all the three emotions. 
It’s important to take into account that these emotions are different, and that are linked to 
different behavioural outcomes. Maybe what we really found is a general negative attitude 
towards the Dissimilar nationalities, expressed with higher ratings for the three negative 
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emotions chosen here. 
Taken together, Study 1.a and Study 1.b tell us important information about dispositions toward 
the different nationalities considered here, but what about the interaction with them? In Study 
1.c we will investigate interactive behaviour using the UG with our participants in the role of 
receivers and virtual proposers from the 12 nations considered before. 
 
2.2.3 – Study 1.c: The Bargaining Behaviour Towards Similar and Dissimilar 
Individuals 
In this third study we wanted to investigate if the NCC trait, because of its motivational nature, 
plays a crucial role in deciding to accept or reject offers by proposers of Similar vs Dissimilar 
nationalities. Our hypothesis was that Hi-NCC individuals tend to reject more when the 
proposer is Outgroup than Ingroup. 
Procedure 
143 healthy Italian adults (75 males) (age: Mean=33.7, SD=±8.7, range 18-62 ys), recruited 
using CrowdFlower (www.crowdflower.com), were asked to play online the Ultimatum Game 
and to answer a questionnaire, all built on Survey Monkey (www.surveymonkey,com). We used 
a multiple choice question just to check if participants were paying attention to the whole task 
(see Study1.b). From the original sample of 188 subjects, 45 participants (27 males) were 
removed from the analysis because they didn’t answer correctly to the check-question, or 
because they were not Italian (they were from Spain, Peru, Romania, Finland, Poland and 
USA). Each subject received a 0.50€ payment just for participation, and other 0.50€ if they 
answered in a certain way to a given question (see below).  
Ultimatum Game.  
In our study, all the participants always played the role of receivers  against virtual proposers 
split in two different groups (considering results obtained in Study 1.a and Study 1.b):  
“Similar” (Italian, Irish, Spanish, English, Swedish and Swiss proposers) and “Dissimilar” 
(Albanian, Romani, Arab, Chinese, Pakistani and Romanian proposers). All the virtual 
proposers could split the starting fixed amount (10€) in four different ways: a) take 5€ for 
himself and give 5€ to the participant (5:5), b) take 6€ for himself and give 4€ to the participant 
(4:6), c) take 7€ for himself and give 3€ to the participant (3:7), and d) take 9€ for himself and 
give 1€ to the participant (1:9) (as in Chapman et al., 2009).  
(see an example in Figure2.2.3). This experimental design has the following structure: 4 
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(offers: 5:5 vs 4:6 vs 3:7 vs 1:9) x 2 (group membership of the proposer: Similar vs Dissimilar). 
In addition to the starting 0.50€ real retribution given to participants just because of their 
voluntary involvement in the study, we gave other 0.50€ to whom answered “accept” to the fair 
offer (5:5) made by the Swiss proposer, telling them, at the beginning of the procedure, that a 
random trial would be extracted and, if he/she accepts, it would be paid 0.50€ more. This was 
just to push participants to complete all the on-line experiment. 
 
 
Figure2.2.3: Example of an UG stimulus. In this case, the virtual player is from Albany, and he’s giving 
50cents to the participant (offer 5:5). 
Questionnaire.  
As in Study 1.b, participants had to answer to the Need For Cognitive Closure scale (NCC, 
Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; Kruglanski et al., 2013) in its 15-items version (Roets & Van 
Hiel, 2007). 
Ultimatum Game’s offers and Questionnaire were presented in a randomized order. 
Results 
We performed a nested mixed-models analysis (“lme4” R package), starting with a model 
having participants’ ID number and proposer’s nationality as fixed effects. We found a general 
higher rejection proportion for the Dissimilar (Albanians, Romani, Arabs, Chinese, Pakistanis 
and Romanians) compared to the Similar proposers (Italians, Irish, Spanish, English, Swedes 
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and Swiss) (Figure2.2.4). This difference was significant for three offers: 4:6 (z=3.409, 
p<.001), 3:7 (z=3.019, p<.01) and 1:9 (z=3.595, p<.001) (not for the offer 5:5, with z=1.187, 
p=.23). Implementing in the starting model the interaction between the offer and the NCC 
levels (Cronbach’s Alpha=.869), we found a strong interaction effect (p<.001), so we decided 
to select two sub-samples from the original one: i) individuals with low levels of NCC (Lo-
NCC, 1
st
 quartile of the distribution for the NCC scale), and ii) individuals with high levels of 
NCC (Hi-NCC, last quartile), as in Study 1.b. 
 
 
Figure2.2.4: General rejection trend for Similar vs Dissimilar groups in all the offers.  
*=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001. 
Then, we analysed the proportion of rejection of the four offers for both Similar and Dissimilar 
groups in the two sub-samples. In the new model with the Hi-NCC sub-sample (39 participants 
selected), we found a difference in the proportion of rejection between the Similar (less 
rejected) and the Dissimilar (more rejected) groups for the offers 4:6 (z=2.146, p<.05) e 1:9 
(z=3.197, p<.01), but not for the fair offer 5:5 (z=.803, p=.42) and for 3:7 (z=1.808, p=.07). 
Considering the model with Lo-NCC sub-sample (40 participants selected), we didn’t found 
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significant differences for Similar vs Dissimilar nationalities for any offer (5:5, z=.922, p=.35; 
4:6, z=1.457, p=.14; 3:7, z=.154, p=.87; 1:9, z=1.314, p=.19;) (Figure2.2.5). 
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Figure2.2.5: Differences in Rejection rate for Positive vs Negative groups in all the offers (up panel = 
“Hi-NCC” subsample; down panel = “Lo-NCC” subsample). 
*=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001. 
 
Discussion 
In general, the more the offer was unfair, the more it was rejected. We found a higher rejection 
rate when the proposer’s nationality was one of the more Dissimilar and the more 
Disgust/Anger/Fear-eliciting ones (see Study1.a and Study1.b). This is true for all the offers 
except for the 5:5 fair offer (50% of the starting amount), for which we didn’t found any 
difference considering the similarity. After the extraction of the two sub-samples, as 
hypothesized, we found that individuals with low levels of NCC behave in the same way for 
both Similar and Dissimilar proposers, with no significant differences in none of the offers. On 
the other hand, individuals with high levels of NCC rejected more the 1:9 (10% of the starting 
amount) and the 4:6 (40% of the starting amount) offers when the proposer was Dissimilar, 
while there was no difference for the other two offers. The p-value of the difference between 
Similar vs Dissimilar in the rejection rate, for the Hi-NCC subgroup, of 3:7 offer is .07, so we 
can state that it is not significant, but that it follows the trend of the other offers (in R, p-values 
close to significance are labelled with the “.” symbol, and this was the case). 
 
2.2.4 – General discussion 
In this research, we investigated the role of perceived Similarity, three negative emotions 
(Anger, Disgust and Fear), and levels of Need for Cognitive Closure in shaping the attitudes 
towards different nationalities, and, more in specific, in bargaining behaviour of Italian 
receivers, using the Ultimatum Game.  
In Study1.a we saw that Italian individuals tend to consider European countries more Similar to 
them in terms of culture and moral standards, except for Albania (which is not part of the EU 
but is geographically sited in Europe) and Romania. We argued this result taking into account 
the Italian immigration flow of the last fifteen years (Zanfrini, 2013). Study1.a also tells us that 
the two constructs (Closeness and Similarity) we considered for our on-line survey underpin the 
same factor, so the more a nationality is perceived as Similar, the more it’s also perceived as 
culturally (not geographically) Close. 
In Study1.b we wanted to understand if nationalities seen as more Dissimilar are also perceived 
as more Disgust/Anger/Fear-eliciting. As expected, we found that the Dissimilar nationalities 
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(Albanian, Romani, Arab, Romanian, Chinese and Pakistani) are also the ones that in general 
elicit more Disgust, Anger and Fear in our Italian sample. This is interesting considering the 
different nature of these three emotions: Disgust helps us to avoid possible contaminants (also 
“moral” contaminants), Anger elicits a fight-or-fly response, while Fear pushes individuals to 
avoid possible dangerous stimuli. 
Extracting the two sub-samples, Hi-NCC and Lo-NCC, we can see that both are more prone to 
feel all the three negative emotions toward the Dissimilar nationalities, but the first one gave 
general higher ratings compared to the second one. This result is in line with literature about 
Ingroup-Outgroup dynamics, in which is highlighted that high levels of NCC correlate with 
stronger stereotyping attitudes, prejudice toward immigrants (Dhont et al., 2013), and, more in 
general, a group-centric behaviour (Kruglanski et al., 2006) and, consequently, an intergroup 
hostility (e.g., Golec, 2002; Kruglanski, Shah, Pierro & Mannetti, 2002). 
It is interesting to underline results about Romani nationality in both Study1.a and Study1.b: it 
is considered as the most Dissimilar and the most Disgust/Anger/Fear-eliciting nationality, and 
it is the one in which the difference between Hi-NCC and Lo-NCC participants’ emotional 
ratings are the biggest. This could be an interesting starting point for further investigations 
about the relationship between Italian and Romani cultures, considering the levels of individual 
Cognitive Closure, but this was not the main aim of our studies. 
In Study1.c, we assessed the bargaining behaviour at the UG of an Italian sample that had to 
play the role of receiver with proposers from the same countries considered in Study1.a and 
Study1.b. We found a significant difference in the rejection rate between Similar (less rejected) 
vs Dissimilar (more rejected) nationalities for all the offers, except for the most fair one (the 
proposer offers 50% of the total amount to the receiver). This is probably due to the fact that 
5:5 was the most convenient offer a player could receive in our UG, and, in literature, it is 
accepted most of the times (e.g., Civai, Crescentini, Rustichini & Rumiati, 2012; Corradi-
Dell’Acqua, Civai, Rumiati & Fink, 2013; Güth et al., 1982; Rilling & Sanfey, 2011); so we 
could consider the non significant difference between Similar vs Dissimilar as a matter of costs 
against benefits. Probably, a 50% offer was seen as too good to reject, regardless of the 
Similarity and the emotions elicited by the proposer’s nationality. It is possible that at a certain 
point it became clear to participants that the highest offer they could receive was 50% of the 
total amount, and that it was counterproductive to reject it. The extraction of the Hi-NCC and 
Lo-NCC sub-samples shows us different results. In literature, individuals with high levels of 
NCC show a higher general arousal, measured through Galvanic Skin Response (GSR, Roets & 
Van Hiel, 2008; Roets et al., 2015). Taking into account that skin conductance activity is 
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higher also when an individual receives an unfair offer at the UG, and it’s related to the 
rejection rate of unfair offers (Van’t Wout, Khan, Sanfey & Aleman, 2006), we could speculate 
that Hi-NCC sub-sample rejected more the 1:9 offer by Dissimilar proposers also because of a 
higher negative arousal raised up by the Dissimilar nationalities. Using the third-party 
punishment paradigm (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004), Hao, Yang & Wang (2016) found that 
sharing and altruistic punishment behaviours are both related to a higher emotional arousal. 
This could help us to better delineate an emotional-motivational frame for the rejection of the 
offer 1:9 in the UG in Study1.c, but it needs further investigation using the third-party 
punishment paradigm. What remains unclear to explain is the significant difference in rejection 
rate between Hi-NCC and Lo-NCC sub-samples when they receive 4:6 (40% of the total 
amount) offer by the Similar (less rejected) vs Dissimilar (more rejected) proposers. The real 
contradiction is that, for the less fair offer 3:7 (30% of the total amount), there are no 
significant differences between Similar vs Dissimilar proposers neither for Hi-NCC nor for Lo-
NCC participants, but, as already explained, there was a close-to-significant trend (p=.07). This 
is probably solvable enlarging the sample size, that is around 40 individuals per each sub-
sample, and a further investigation is needed. 
A possible explanation that connects all the results in Study1 could be that individuals with 
high levels of NCC are more threatened by Outgroup members, that are perceived as 
Dissimilar, and induce general negative emotions that drive more rejections of offers by the 
proposers from these nationalities. 
This work is an introduction to the use of economic games in the investigation of dispositional 
Need for Cognitive Closure. With this kind of tasks, it is possible to assess motivational 
differences due to NCC levels in negotiation and bargaining behaviour between different 
groups, investigating intergroup biases and prejudice from a strong motivational point of view.  
 
2.3 - Study2: The Role of Need for Cognitive Closure in Bargaining 
Behaviour: an Ingroup/Outgroup fMRI Study. 
The study proposed here, with a between design (participants with high levels of NCC, “Hi-
NCC”, and with low levels of NCC, “Lo-NCC”), aims to find neural differences in bargaining 
behaviour at the Ultimatum Game (UG, Güth et al., 1982), with Ingroup vs Outgroup 
proposers, for responders with different levels of NCC. As already explained in Chapter1, just 
one fMRI study has been performed looking for differences between Hi-NCC and Lo-NCC 
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(Viola et al., 2014), but the task used in this study was a merely cognitive one (Flanker Task), 
not directly linked with motivation and bargaining. As well known, NCC directly influences 
several cognitive processes, like information processing, action monitoring, unaware 
preliminary judgments and need for cognition (see Roets et al., 2015). Here we try to find 
neural basis of motivation for both Hi-NCC and Lo-NCC sub-samples, considering its 
epistemic nature. We can consider this study as an exploratory one, so we didn’t define precise 
Regions Of Interest (ROIs) at the beginning, but we hypothesized a role of the frontal cortex, 
because of its involvement in decision-making and action monitoring. Another reason why we 
decided not to define ROIs is that we didn’t want to assess differences between fair and unfair 
offers (the most used contrast in UG literature, see Gabay et al., 2014), but we focused on the 
intermediate offers, in which we thought that Ingroup/Outgroup membership could have a 
stronger influence than the offers per se. Defining ROIs starting from studies interested in 
different contrasts could negatively affect our results, so we decided for a more explorative 
approach.  
Procedure 
37 neurotypical healthy right-handed adults (18 males) (age: Mean=25.34, SD= ± 3.92, range 
19-34 ys), selected from a starting database of 198 participants who answered the NCC scale 
(Cronbach’s Alpha=.848) questionnaire (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; Kruglanski et al., 2013), 
were recruited. The whole sample (NCC score Mean=148.259, SD= ± 21.661) was made by 17 
Hi-NCC (last quartile of the distribution, from 162 to 205) and 20 Lo-NCC (first quartile of the 
distribution, from 82 to 134) participants. From the original sample of 39 participants, 2 of 
them were excluded due to technical issues. The stimuli used are pictures of males and females 
with neutral expression from the Karolinska database (72 pictures, 36 males and 36 females). 
The total amount of neutral faces in this database is 70 (35 males and 35 females), so we 
modified one male (image #58) and one female (image #27) pictures, changing hair colour and 
modifying skin luminance. None of the participants noticed that two images were repeated. In a 
cover story, we say to participants that the pictures were taken from an older experiment from 
2014, and that they depict participants who played as proposers at the UG, and that we 
modelled and reproduce their real behaviour with a 97-98% accuracy. Stimuli have a purple or 
beige frame, and the participant has to wear a purple or beige t-shirt, in a counterbalanced 
order. We decided for these two colours after an on-line survey in which, from a sample of 83 
individuals, we asked to report their emotions (from 1, very negative, to 10, very positive) 
toward different colours (see Figure 2.3.1). The aim of this colour manipulation was to induce 
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a minimal Ingroup/Outgroup categorization of the fake proposers. We told to our participants 
that the proposers of the older experiment answered the same questionnaire as they did (NCC 
scale), and that if their t-shirt’s colour was matched with the picture’s frame, they had similar 
personological and dispositional features, if not, vice versa. 
 
Figure 2.3.1: Means and Standard Deviations of positive/negative emotions toward colours. Beige and Purple are 
the more neutral ones. On the Y-axis there are the points of the Likert scale, on the X-axis there are the different 
colours proposed. 
Participants had to play as receivers (to decide if accept/reject the offer) for 3 functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) sessions (around 9.4 minutes per each session), with a 5-6 
minute break between each of them. Starting from an amount of 10 virtual Euros, the possible 
offers by the fake proposers were: take 5€ for himself and give 5€ to the participant (5:5), b) 
take 6€ for himself and give 4€ to the participant (4:6), c) take 7€ for himself and give 3€ to the 
participant (3:7), and d) take 9€ for himself and give 1€ to the participant (1:9) (as in Chapman 
et al., 2009). We decided to use these possible offers to stay in line with Study1.c. The offers 
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were not perfectly balanced: the 3:7 and 4:6 offers were presented two times the 5:5 and 1:9 
ones, because we hypothesized a higher variability between Hi-NCC and Lo-NCC sub-samples 
in the intermediate offers than in the fair and unfair ones. Participants viewed the stimuli with a 
mirror that reflected the image from the projection screen placed at the head of the scanner bed. 
 
Figure 2.3.2: Example of experimental procedure with 3:7 offer. 
 
Before the fMRI sessions, we administered to participants a brief example (12 trials) of the 
experiments to make them familiarize with it out of the scanner. In this preliminary part, after 
every trial, we added a four alternative forced options question about the emotion it elicited 
more in the participant between Anger, Disgust, Fear and Happiness. 
fMRI images were acquired on a 3T Siemens Allegra MR system (Siemens Medical Systems, 
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Erlangen,  Germany) operating at Santa Lucia Foundation, using a standard head coil. A 
control computer  located outside the MR room generated stimuli by running in-house software 
written in Cogent 2000  (developed at FIL and ICN, UCL, London, UK) and implemented in 
MATLAB (The MathWorks Inc.,  Natick, MA, USA). Echo-planar functional MR images 
(TR = 2.08s, TE = 2.015s, flip angle = 70°, 64×64 image matrix,  3×3 mm in-plane resolution, 32 
slices, 3 mm slice thickness with a 0.8mm gap, sequential  excitation order) were acquired in 
the AC–PC plane using blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) imaging. From the 
superior convexity, sampling included all the cerebral cortex. 
 
Preprocessing and fMRI Data Analysis 
 
Functional magnetic resonance images were pre-processed and analyzed using SPM12 
(Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). Functional MR images from 
each subject were  first re-oriented to the AC-PC plane, then spatially corrected for head 
movement, using a least-squares approach and six-parameter rigid body spatial transformations, 
and temporally corrected for slice timing, using the  middle slice acquired in time as a 
reference. Functional data were then spatially normalized using an automatic nonlinear 
stereotaxic normalization procedure (final voxel size: 2×2×2 mm) and spatially smoothed with 
a three-dimensional Gaussian filter (8 mm full width at half maximum). The spatial 
normalisation process for each participant was based on one of his/her own image. 
Images were analyzed using a standard random-effects procedure. At the first stage, the time 
series of functional MR images obtained from each participant was analyzed separately. The 
effects of the experimental paradigm were estimated on a voxel-by-voxel basis, according to 
the general linear model (GLM) extended to allow the analysis of fMRI data as a time series. 
The onset of each trial constituted a neural event that was modelled using a canonical 
Hemodynamic Response Function (HRF), chosen to represent the relationship between 
neuronal activation and blood flow changes. 
At the second stage, linear compounds of subject-specific images of parameters estimates were  
entered in group analyses in which every subject was treated as a random effect. The resulting  
statistical parametric maps (T statistics) were thresholded at p<.001. 
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Behavioural results 
In the preliminary familiarization part, we analyzed the emotions elicited by each 
Ingroup/Outgroup offers for both Hi-NCC and Lo-NCC sub-samples. In Figure 2.3.3 we 
reported the percentage of Anger, Disgust, Fear and Happiness rated by Hi-NCC and Lo-NCC 
participants for each of the four offers both from Ingroup and Outgroup proposers. 
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Figure 2.3.3: Percentages (Y-axis) of every emotion rated by both Hi-NCC (upper panel) and Lo-NCC (lower 
panel) per each received offer. 
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We analyzed the rejection rate per each offer by Ingroup vs Outgroup proposers for both Hi-
NCC and Lo-NCC sub-samples (4 offers X 2 proposers X 2 NCC levels). We performed a one-
way ANOVA, finding out that the offer 3:7, by both Ingroup and Outgroup proposers, was 
rejected significantly more by Hi-NCC sub-sample than Lo-NCC one (Ingroup: F(7.311), 
p=.011, Eta
2
= 0.173; Outgroup: F(4.511), p=.041, Eta
2
= 0.114). The results remained the same 
after Welch and Brown-Forsythe robust tests of equality of means. Results are showed in 
Figure 2.3.4. 
 
Figure 2.3.4: Percentages of Rejection Rate by Hi-NCC and Lo-NCC sub-samples per each offer (1:9, 3:7, 4:6 
and 5:5) made by Ingroup vs Outgroup proposers.  
*= p<.05. 
Functional neuroimaging results 
We performed t-contrasts per each offer (1:9, 3:7, 4:6 and 5:5) by both Ingroup and Outgroup 
proposers for the two NCC sub-samples. 
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Regardless of the offer, we found a significant difference in the Lo-NCC group when facing an 
Ingroup member compared to an Outgroup one, but we didn’t find the same difference in the 
Hi-NCC sub-sample. Specifically, without considering the offers, we found a significant cluster 
(p(FWR-corr)<.001, p(FDR-corr)=.003) in the internal part of the Superior Frontal Gyrus 
(SFG), more precisely in the posterior rostral middle frontal cortex (prMFC), bilaterally 
activated when participants with low levels of NCC plays at the UG with an Ingroup (vs 
Outgroup) proposer (see Figure2.3.5). This activation was not present for Hi-NCC sub-sample. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3.5: 3D render (obtained with MRIcrogl) of the activation of Superior Frontal Gyrus in Lo-NCC sub-
sample for Ingroup proposers. 
We also found a significant difference between Hi-NCC and Lo-NCC groups just for the 4:6 
offer when proposed by an Outgroup member, but not for all the other offers. Specifically, we 
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found a significant cluster (p(FWR-corr)=.005, p(FDR-corr)=.008) in the right posterior portion 
of the Fusiform Gyrus (FG), activated for the Hi-NCC participants but not for the Lo-NCC ones 
(see Figure2.3.6). 
 
 
Figure 2.3.6: 3D render (obtained with MRIcrogl) of the activation of Fusiform Gyrus in Hi-NCC sub-sample for 
the offer 4:6 proposed by Ongroup members. 
Discussion 
In a recent meta-analysis about brain activations during the UG, it has been shown that anterior 
insula (AI), anterior cingulated cortex (ACC), supplementary motor area (SMA) and 
cerebellum are activated in response to unfair offers (Gabay, Radua, Kempton & Mehta, 2014), 
and that AAC, SMA and Putamen are activated during the decision of rejecting rather than 
accepting UG offers (Gabay et al., 2014; Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure & Cohen, 2006).  
In literature, the activity of the Superior Frontal Gyrus (SFG) and the medial frontal cortex 
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(MFC) has been widely investigated and related to different behavioural outcomes. The 
posterior rostral MFC (prMFC), as reviewed by Amodio and Firth (2006), is involved in action 
monitoring processes (Botvinik, Cohen & Carter, 2004). Specifically, it seems to be involved in 
1) conflict monitoring, 2) error monitoring, and 3) response selection, and all of these processes 
might depend on a single underlying sub-process generated by the prMFC (Amodio & Firth, 
2006). Another crucial role is played by this region on the perception of monetary gain/loss. 
More in detail, Gehring and Willoughby (2002), in an ERPs study, found that the middle 
frontal areas are sensitive to money loss compared to money gain. Taking into account these 
roles of the MFC, we can say that Lo-NCC individuals are more sensitive to monetary loss at 
the UG when the proposer is Ingroup, and that probably they are performing a more accurate 
response selection process, aimed to avoid the monetary loss. Considering that at the UG, if the 
receiver rejects the offer, none of the two players receive money, probably it could lead to a 
“intra-group” preoccupation of community money loss. This interpretation is in line with the 
well documented tendency to work for the ingroup micro-efficiency (Schwartz-Shea & 
Simmons, 1990). Maybe, individuals with low levels of Need for Cognitive Closure have a 
stronger tendency to avoid group money loss. This is a purely speculative interpretation, but 
could open a new scientific path to walk. 
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Figure 2.3.7: Functional map of the medial frontal cortex (taken from Amodio & Firth, 2006) 
 
This result is not in line with our preliminary hypothesis, that Hi-NCC individuals could show a 
stronger activation of frontal regions in receiving offers from Outgroup proposers. As already 
explained at the beginning, this study is mostly explorative, so our initial hypothesis was not 
really strong, and we didn’t focus too much on it. 
The activation of the FG, specifically the Fusiform Face Area (FFA), is associated with the 
perception of human faces (Kanwisher, McDermott & Chun, 1997), but has also been found a 
FG greater activation in response to “co-operators” involved in a socially interactive game with 
the participants (Singer, Kiebel, Winston et al., 2004). A possible explanation for the activation 
of this area in the 4:6 offer by Outgroup proposers could be due to the fact that Hi-NCC 
participants start to consider as a co-operator an Outgroup member when he proposes a quite 
fair offer. Maybe the 5:5 offer was to fair to elicitate any kind of significant difference in FG 
activation, and also it was administered half of the times compared to the 4:6 offer. 
These results appear still confusing, but they allow to begin further investigations about neural 
basis of motivation under an Ingroup/Outgroup point of view. 
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2.4 – Conclusions 
In this two studies we have seen how dispositional levels of NCC can shape the intergroup 
relationships and the bargaining behaviour. The constellation of behavioural results that we 
obtained are in line with the scientific literature, adding also important information about how 
NCC could be crucial in facing the others and find the best response to social stimulations, both 
from Ingroup and Outgroup members. We also found interesting and new neuroimaging data 
that are in part counterintuitive, but that could open unexplored aspects of the relationship 
between the motivational construct of NCC and the brain activity during a social interaction. 
Also, these results drive us to the investigation of the relationship between the Need for 
Cognitive Closure and the attitude toward a money gain or loss (specially in a social context 
like the Ultimatum Game, that allow us to study behavioural outcomes of socio-economic 
epistemic motivation). Now we know that MFC and FG play a crucial role in bargaining 
behaviour, and that this role is mediated by NCC levels. An interesting future direction could 
be the analysis of connectivity between these areas and the other areas associated with 
acceptance and rejection at the UG. It will be also interesting to use other economic games 
(e.g., Trust Game, Dictator Game), and to put participants in the role of proposer at the UG, to 
investigate this motivational behaviour (and underpinning neural substrates) from another point 
of view. 
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3.  General Discussion 
____________________________________________________ 
 
In the present two studies, we aimed to investigate the intergroup relations and the role 
of NCC and emotions in shaping and driving them. With Study1 (1.a, 1.b and 1.c), we 
found that at an UG in which they played as receivers, participants with high (vs low) 
levels of NCC tended to reject more offers from Outgroup proposers (considered less 
culturally Similar from themselves), from the most Disgust/Anger/Fear-eliciting 
nationalities. In Study2 we found a higher rejection rate by Hi-NCC receivers for both 
Outgroup and Ingroup just for the offer 3:7, but the group manipulation was weaker 
than in Study1. We found an interesting middle frontal activation in the Lo-NCC sub-
sample when the proposer was an Ingroup one, regardless of the offer. For the Hi-
NCC sub-sample, we found an activation of the Fusiform Gyrus for the offer 4:6 
proposed by Outgroup proposers (an offer which is close to the fairest one 5:5). 
Taken together, these studies underline the close relationship between emotions and 
cognitive closure in shaping the idea of the “others” as Ingroup or Outgroup, and in 
driving concretely the motivational behaviour and the decision-making style in line 
with this idea. This field absolutely needs further investigations to be better 
understood, and to open a safer path to the unveiling of the intergroup relationships. 
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 APPENDIX A: The Arithmetic of Emotional Contagion 
__________________________________________________ 
1– Introduction 
“Ideas, sentiments, emotions, and beliefs possess in crowds a contagious power as intense as 
that of microbes” (Gustave Le Bon, 1896). In support of this statement, there are several studies 
about crowds’ behaviour. For example, it’s well described a flocking mechanism inside crowds 
and groups, which is comparable with the one observed in fishes and birds (Lazarsfeld & 
Merton, 1954; McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001). Flocking is defined as an almost 
simultaneous movement across time and space of ecologically proximate individuals (Dobrev, 
2005). Crowds have also a sort of collective decision-making style, shaped by informational 
cascades that induce decision-makers to ignore their own private information in favour of 
imitating others who faced the same decision earlier on (Huck & Oechssler, 1999; 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch, 1992). Informational cascade leads to a herding 
phenomenon, that represents behavioural patterns correlated across individuals (Devenow & 
Welch, 1996). Herding can also cause a systematic erroneous decision-making by entire 
populations (ibidem). In literature, the role of individual and shared emotions in giving rise to 
this kind of behaviour is quite neglected (Szanto, 2015). In shaping shared emotions, the single 
individual is not extinct, but we found both an 1) individual subject and a 2) plural subject, a 
“we-subject” (Stein, 1922). This we-subject is not an extra-entity, it is a plural subject not ego-
like, but a “social integrate” of individuals (Pettit, 2003; Szanto, 2014). About the structure of a 
shared emotion, there are two distinct intentional directions: 1) a supra-individual emotional 
focus that is shared and also targeted and experienced as shared, and 2) an intention directed 
towards the sharing of an experience of emotion itself (Szanto, 2015). Considering this we-
subject with a plural emotional state (individual and social), it is to take into account the so 
called “emotional contagion” phenomenon. Contagiousness of emotions is considered in 
literature since a long time (Darwin, 1872/1965; Jung, 1968; Reik, 1948). The term “Emotional 
Contagion” describes a complex process as a collection of aware perceptions, social 
evaluations and unaware automatic sub-processes (Hatfield et al., 1994). These unaware sub-
processes are called “Primitive Contagion”, defined as the automatic mimicking and 
synchronisation of own facial expressions, vocalisations, postures and gestures of another 
individual, converging emotionally with him/her (Hatfield et al., 1994; Hsee et al., 1990). 
Emotional Contagion seems to play a mediation role between facial mimicry (the tendency to 
automatically imitate, with own facial muscles, the expression on the face of the interlocutor) 
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and accuracy in recognising emotions watching videos of individuals who express them 
(Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010).  In literature, most of the results show that women are more 
reactive with mimicry in respect to men (Dimberg & Lundqvist, 1990; Kring & Gordon, 1998), 
and they are also more prone to be emotionally infected (Doherty et al., 1993). More recently, 
Wild and colleagues (2001) didn’t found gender differences in emotional contagion (they 
considered just happiness and sadness), but they found that pictures of women with happy faces 
evoke in both male and female individuals a higher level of happiness than pictures of happy 
men, and the same goes for sadness. Individuals regulate their  own emotional responses 
considering the situational context. In Lang’s point of view (Lang, 1995; Lang & Bradley, 
2008), emotions can be considered as “action dispositions” that quickly prepare the organism 
for an appropriate response toward significant emotionally charged stimuli. A largely debated 
example of this active point of view of emotions, is that the perception of positive stimuli 
facilitates an approach behaviour, while the perception of negative stimuli facilitates an 
avoidant behaviour (Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010). It is possible to measure this behaviour in 
different ways (Measures of Approach-Avoidance Behaviour, MAAB). One of the most used 
task for measuring the approach/avoidance behaviour is the Joystick Task, in which if the 
participant pulls backward the joystick he’s approaching with the stimulus, while if he pushes it 
forward he’s avoiding the stimulus (es. Chen & Bargh, 1999; Rinck & Becker, 2007). Later, 
this task has been modified adding the illusion that the stimulus moves off when the joystick is 
pushed forward, and it moves up when the joystick is pulled backward. This variant task is 
called Feedback-Joystick Task (Seibt, Neumann, Nussinson & Strack, 2008). 
 
2 – Virtual Reality for Studying Social and Affective Phenomena 
To introduce the salience of virtual reality (VR) in studying emotions social interactions 
between plural agents, it is necessary to describe two critical phenomena: “Togetherness” and 
“Co-presence”. The term togetherness (Durlach & Slater, 2000) is referred to the sense of being 
with other people in the same shared Virtual Environment (VE). For example, we can consider 
four different individuals, each one with his own virtual station and virtual avatar that can move 
into a shared VE. Co-presence is the sense of being in front of a virtual audience compared to 
being with a real one (Slater et al., 1999). It has been shown that different kind of virtual 
audience can influence a public speaker’s performance. People with phobia of public speaking 
are characterized by an increase of self-reported anxiety (measured with a five-questions 
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questionnaire), self-focus attention on somatic responses and an enhancement of the heart rate 
(Slater et al., 2006). Also, a virtual audience which looks bored and disappointed can trigger an 
anxiety response compared to the normal level of public speaking confidence (Pertaub et al., 
2002). These two phenomena frame well the effect of VR in manipulating and re-structuring 
the social domain, creating a realistic social context. Taken together, all these findings 
underline the comparability between experiencing a real social environment and a virtual one. 
VR also allows researchers in psychology and neuroscience to test social situations that, in real 
life, could be considered immoral and unethical, without evident negative effects on 
participants. A clear example of this kind of social VE is given by the remake of an old 
Milgram’s 1960s paradigm, in an environment with avatars instead of real actors (Slater et al., 
2006). In the original experiment, with the goal to investigate obedience to an authority figure 
who asked to cause pain to a stranger, the participant had to deliver an electrical shock (that 
was fake) at different intensities to an actor who pretended to being hurt. Most of the 
participants did hurt the actor delivering him high electric shocks, sometimes until he pretended 
to get faint (Milgram & van Gasteren, 1974). In the virtual reality study, in which the 
participants knew that both the avatar and the shock they were delivering were fake, results 
showed that they perceived the situation as real, at a subjective behavioural and physiological 
(skin conductance and heart rate were analysed) level (Slater et al., 2006). A circular 
correlation between the sense of presence and emotions has been demonstrated (Riva et al., 
2007). Immerging an individual into a VE with an avatar which performs facial expressions, 
works as well as non-immersive procedures for the study of emotion recognition by facial 
expressions (Faita et al., 2016), specially when the avatars show naturalistic dynamic 
expression changes (Faita et al., 2015). It was found that the feeling of presence was greater 
when an individual was immersed into an “emotional” VE (for example, an ‘anxious’ park vs a 
‘relaxing’ one), and, on the other hand, the subjective emotional state was influenced by the 
level of presence (ibidem). It has been also demonstrated that the avatars’ emotional 
connotations can change the preference of participants on them, inducing an empathic response 
(Rodrigues et al., 2009).  
VR methods allow researchers to manipulate participants’ socio-affective dimension in a way 
that is practically not possible in the real environment, inducing changes in ingroup/outgroup 
prejudice and stereotypes, eliciting emotions and moods, and making people interact and 
collaborate in new ways. We decided to develop a VR procedure for Study 3 to have a 
laboratory experience both well controlled and as ecologic as possible. 
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3 – Influence of Emotional Contagion on Approach/Avoidance 
Behaviour: An empirical study. 
The main purpose of this project was to investigate if there is a group-effect on emotional 
contagion. Specifically, we wanted to see if a single participant’s emotion and 
approach/avoidance behaviour is different when he has to face one avatar (one-to-one) or three 
of them (one-to-many). Our hypothesis was that being emotionally contaminated by a facial 
expression could interfere with a mere cognitive task in terms of accuracy and Reaction Times 
(RTs). 
 This could be a first step to the understanding of the way in which emotions are shared 
between single individuals and groups. It could help to understand organizations’ dynamics and 
crowd herding and flocking behaviours, and also informational cascade process.  
In previous studies about Emotional Contagion, most of the times there were used stimuli like 
static pictures of faces or dynamic 2D videos of the transition from a neutral expression to an 
emotive one. Virtual Reality (VR) could help us to create a more naturalistic context, 
maintaining at the same time the scientific accuracy of a laboratory experiment. 
Procedure 
A total of 30 neurotypical right-handed male participants (age: Mean=22.63, SD= ± 2.91, range 
18-30 ys) has been tested. We’ve created three different male avatars using the software iClone 
6. For each of them, we developed three different animations: 1) neutral (the avatars just blink 
twice and open/close the mouth going back to a neutral expression), 2) angry, and 3) happy. 
We choose the emotions of anger (negative emotion) and happiness (positive emotion) because 
of their well documented Superiority Effect to be identified in a crowd (Hansen & Hansen 
1988; Craig et al. 2014), and, considering anger, because of an also known Threat Superiority 
Effect (Fox & Damjanovic, 2006). For this study, we used the “PowerWall” apparatus (see 
Figure A.1), a 1m X 1.5m retroprojected screen, with a 3D projector on the back. Using a pair 
of Optoma 3D active glasses, participants saw stimuli as they were popping-out from the screen 
(around 20cm out of it). On the glasses, there were three infra-red markers, tracked by four 
Optitrack cameras on the four corners on the screen, in order to maintain the shape and position 
of the stimuli always stable with participant’s head position. 
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Figure A.1: Experimental setup used for Study3. 
We developed also two tones with neutral valence using Audacity, respectively with a 
frequency of 880Hz (acute tone) and 440Hz (low tone), with a sinusoidal structure and a 300ms 
duration. 
Participants had to face, depending on the trial, one or three avatars performing one of the three 
expressions. The experiment was structured in two blocks with different instructions: in Block 
A they had to push the joystick forward, as fast and accurate as they can, when the acute tone 
was presented, and they had to pull backward the joystick when the low tone was presented, 
while in Block B they had to do the opposite. Pushing the joystick, the avatars were set to move 
toward the participant (20cm on the Z-axis), while pulling it the avatars were set to move away 
from him (-20cm on the Z-axis). This kind of task is called “Feedback-Joystick Task”, and it 
has been already used in literature (Seibt, Neumann, Nussinson & Strack, 2008). We decided to 
use this task because going forward could also be interpreted by participants as withdrawal, and 
going backward as bringing the stimulus closer. Every block was made by a total of 72 stimuli, 
36 single avatars and 36 groups, and the two blocks were counterbalanced between subjects. 
There was a 5-minutes break between the blocks, and both before and after the procedure, 
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participants answered to some questions (see below). The total experimental session had a 
duration of about one hour. Our starting hypothesis was to find slower RTs when participants 
had to pull the joystick but the expression (of both one or three avatars) was happy, and when 
they had to push the joystick but the group of three avatars was angry. We also predicted a 
more variable response for one single angry avatar, considering that anger, as demonstrated 
(eg., Marsh, Ambady & Kleck, 2005; Heuer, Rinck & Becker, 2007), can induce both approach 
and avoidance behaviour. 
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Figure A.2: Schema of the experimental procedure used in Study3. 
 
Questionnaires. 
Before the experimental session, participants were asked to answer to six selected items of the 
Emotional Contagion Scale (Doherty, 1997): 2, 3, and 11 for happiness, and 5, 7 and 10 for 
anger (from 1 = never, to 4 = always), and to the 7 items of Empatic Concern subscale (EC) of 
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the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis, 1980), on a 5-point Likert scale (from A = does 
not describe me well, to E = Describes me very well). 
Ratings 
We asked participants four questions about the three animations for each avatar 
(4questionsX3avatarsX3animations): 
“Do you think the avatar was expressing an emotion? If yes, what emotion?” 
“How much do you consider this expression Realistic?” 
“Do you consider this expression Positive, Negative or Neutral?” 
“How much do you consider this expression Intense?” 
For the second and the fourth questions, participants had to answer on a 9-points likert scale, 
from 1 (not realistic/intense at all) to 9 (extremely realistic/intense). Then, we asked them two 
questions about the three avatars: 
“At first sight, how much this person could seem to you Trustworthy in real life?” 
(Todorov, Pakrashi & Oosterhof, 2009) 
“If he was a real person, how much could you consider him Attractive?” (Willis & 
Todorov, 2006) 
Participants had to answer on a 9-points likert scale, from 1 (not realistic/intense at all) 
to 9 (extremely realistic/intense). 
Results 
Following the analysis method of RTs for approach/avoidance to emotional faces performed by 
Heuer and collegues (2007), we subtracted, for every subject per each condition, the approach 
median RTs from the avoidance one, and, after a Shapiro-Wilk test that confirmed that RTs of 
most of the conditions were normally distributed, we performed a one-sample t-Test on these 
scores. We obtained a total of 6 conditions: 1) Neutral_Single, 2) Neutral_Group, 3) 
Happy_Single, 4) Happy_Group, 5) Angry_Single, and 6) Angry_Group. We didn’t find any 
significant difference between conditions (see Table A.1 for a t-Test summary). 
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Table  A.1: t-Tests for the approach/avoidance behaviour. No significant results. 
 
From the plot in Figure A.3, we can just say that participants tended more to avoid than to 
approach to the stimuli (as in Heuer, Rinck & Becker, 2007), but we can’t say that this is due to 
the stimuli we used or it’s just a global tendency. 
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Figure A.3: Approach/Avoidance tendency in Study3 toward both Single and Group, for every emotion. 
 
Questionnaires 
Analyzing the three questionnaires we administered to our participants at the beginning of the 
procedure, we found, as reported in Table A.2, a significant correlation between the EC 
subscale of the IRI and the contagiousness by anger measured with three questions from the 
Emotional Contagion scale (r=.442, p<.05). This correlation has a positive coefficient, so the 
higher is the empathic concern level, the higher is the proneness to be contaminated by anger. 
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Table A.2: Correlations between EC, Happiness and Anger. In red the only significant correlation, between Anger 
and EC. In red the significant correlations (p<.05). 
 
Ratings 
Considering Realism per each emotion for each avatar, we found that for the 1
st
 avatar (Av1) 
the Neutral expression has been considered less realistic than the Angry one (t=28.14, p<.05), 
and the same for the 2
nd
 (Av2) (t=27.69, p<.01). For the 3
rd
 avatar (Av3) we found that the 
Happy expression has been rated as less realistic than the Angry one (t=26.21, p<.05). 
About Intensity of the emotions for every avatar, Av2 and Av3’s expressions were considered 
all significantly more intense than Av1’s ones (p<.001 for all the expressions), even the Neutral 
expression.  
Trustworthiness and Attractiveness has been rated as different between the avatars. Av3 has 
been considered the most trustworthy in respect to both Av1 (t=28.28, p<.001) and Av2 
(t=22.62, p<.01). Av1 was judged as the less trustworthy, also compared to Av2 (t=17.11, 
p<.01). The most attractive avatar was Av2 in respect to both Av1 (t=33.49, p<.001) and Av3 
(t=19.37, p<.01). Av1 was rated as the less attractive, also compared to Av3 (t=12.4, p<.001). 
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We found also a difference between trustworthiness and attractiveness in Av2, rated as more 
attractive than trustworthy (p<.001). 
For a graphical representation of ratings’ results, see Figure A.4. 
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Figure A.4: Ratings of Intensity and Realism for all the emotions, and Trustworthiness and 
Attractiveness for Av1, Av2 and Av3. On the Y-axis there are the points of the Likert scales. 
*=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001. 
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For every avatar, the emotions we created has been mostly perceived with the expected 
Valence: 
 Av1: Happy (86.7% Positive), Angry (96.7% Negative), No expression (96.7% 
Neutral).  
 Av2: Happy (86.7% Positive), Angry (96.7% Negative), No expression (90% 
Neutral). 
 Av3: Happy (83.3% Positive), Angry (86.7% Negative), No expression (100% 
Neutral). 
These percentages are graphically shown in Figure A.5. 
 
Figure A.5: Plot of the Positive/Negative/Neutral Valence level per each emotion. On the Y-axis there is 
the percentage. 
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Discussion 
The absence of significant behavioural results could be explained considering the structure of 
the experiment we used. In Heuer and collegues (2007), the approach and avoidance conditions 
were the opposite as in our study: pushing the joystick forward was considered withdrawal 
while pulling it back was considered approach. Considering the movement of the avatars on the 
z-axis, it seems to be not possible that participants misunderstood that pushing the joystick 
made the avatars come near and pulling it made them go further.  
Another possible issue about this procedure could be linked to the entire timing of the 
experiment. Maybe the blocks’ duration (around 18 minutes each) was too long to maintain 
participants’ attention focused and sustained, influencing their RTs at the task. Also, probably 
the choosen intra-trials and inter-trials time-windows were not appropriate for this new task. To 
solve this problem, it could be useful to perform a pilot study measuring arousal level of 
participants (eg., Skin Conductance Response, Heart Rate frequency and variability), to check, 
if some indices are present, when they occur, and so how to change the general timing intra- 
and inter-trial. For the whole duration of the procedure, we should reduce the number of 
presentations and increase the sample size, to ensure an appropriate number of observations. 
The paradigm here proposed is something totally new, aimed to compare the difference 
between emotional contagion driven by a single individual (avatar) and driven by a group of 
three individuals avatars. The future direction to take is to fix all the possible technical and 
structural problems of the task, to understand if it’s really appropriate to study a complex 
phenomenon like emotional contagion, and, if it is, to validate the final procedure and adapt it 
to different possible studies of intergroup interactions (eg. modifying the aspect of the avatars, 
using cover stories on their identity). 
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